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Abstract
Since 1990, both the United Nations and the United States have promoted democratic 
nation-building in confl ict areas. However, despite the common goal of creating stable democ-
racies, the two entities have oft en worked at cross purposes. Following the 1993 debacle in 
Somalia, the United States largely deserted UN nation-building eff orts and moved toward 
unilateral democracy promotion. Over the next decade US eff orts were directed at establish-
ing Lockean procedural democracies, defi ned largely in terms of civil and political institu-
tions. In UN parlance, however, democracy has taken on a holistic meaning that provides for 
the inclusion of social, economic, and cultural factors. This defi nitional dissonance, coupled 
with American conservative hostility toward UN democratic nation-building, undermines 
the eff ectiveness of UN eff orts. US unilateral democracy promotion has proven largely inef-
fective as well. Democratization would be far better served by US support for on-going UN 
nation-building.
Las relaciones US–UN y la promoción de la democracia
Desde 1990, Naciones Unidas y Estados Unidos han promovido la democracia en zonas con-
fl ictivas. Sin embargo, a pesar del propósito común de crear democracias estables, las dos enti-
dades han trabajado de manera distinta. Desde el debacle de 1993 en Somalia, los Estados 
Unidos abandonaron los esfuerzos colectivos y actuaron unilateralmente. En la década 
siguiente sus esfuerzos se dirigieron a establecer democracias procesales, al estilo Locke, defi n-
idas principalmente en términos de instituciones civiles y políticas. En la terminología de las 
Naciones Unidas, sin embargo, la democracia se entiende en sentido global, incluyendo facto-
res sociales, económicos y culturales. Esta disonancia, junto a la hostilidad americana hacia las 
Naciones Unidas, aminora la efectividad de sus esfuerzos. La promoción unilateral de la 
democracia ha sido además inefi caz. La democratización sería mejor servida si los Estados 
Unidos apoyaran la acción de las Naciones Unidas.
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Le rapport des Etats-Unis et l’ONU et la promotion bâtiment de nation
Depuis 1990, les Nations Unies et les Etats-Unis favorisent le bâtiment de nation démocra-
tique dans des régions de confl it. Cependant, en dépit du but commun de créer des démocra-
ties stables, les deux entités se sont souvent contrarié dans leurs buts et méthodes. Après le 
débâcle en Somalie en 1993, les Etats-Unis ont largement abandonné des eff orts de batiment 
de nation de l’ONU et se sont déplacés vers la promotion unilatérale de démocratie. Pendant 
le décennie suivant, les eff orts ont été dirigés à établir des démocraties procédurales dans le 
cadre de Locke, défi nies en termes d’institutions civiles et politiques. En même temps, dans le 
langage de l’ONU, la démocratie a pris une  signifi cation holistique qui prévoit l’inclusion des 
facteurs sociaux, économiques, et culturels. Ce dissonance defi nitionnel, couplé à l’hostilité 
conservatrice américaine vers le bâtiment de nation démocratique de l’ONU, mine l’effi  cacité 
des eff orts de l’ONU. En grande partie, la promotion unilatérale de démocratie des Etats-Unis 
a prouvé aussi bien ineffi  cace. La démocratisation serait meilleur servie par le soutien des Etats-
unis du bâtiment de nation en cours de l’ONU
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Introduction
“So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic 
movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending 
tyranny in our world.”
– US President George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address, 20 January 2005.
“(The goal of the United Nations is) to strengthen the capacity of all our countries to 
implement the principles and practices of democracy and human rights, including 
minority rights.”
–  UN Secretary-General Kofi  Annan, Road Map Towards the Implementation of the 
United Nations Millennium Declaration, 6 September 2001.
For nearly two decades the United Nations has pursued “nation-building” as 
an integral part of its peacekeeping missions. Revising earlier conceptions of 
peacekeeping, recent UN interventions have had among their goals reorder-
ing domestic societies, addressing internal human rights violations, and 
introducing democratic practices, oft en in opposition to the wishes of indig-
enous governments. These “second-generation” peacekeeping operations 
refl ect a post-Cold War preoccupation with a new philosophical orientation 
in UN purposes, and a realization that international peace and security 
depends more heavily now than in the past on the maintenance of viable, 
stable, and popularly supported governments. Cold War UN neutrality 
between socialist and capitalist prescriptions for good government has given 
way to full acceptance of western theories of the democratic state.
SWB 2,1_f8_93-116.indd   94 1/8/07   1:06:51 PM
2
Societies Without Borders, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol2/iss1/7
DOI: 101163/187188607X163284
 J. Pubantz / Societies Without Borders 2 (2007) 93–116 95
Simultaneously the United States, the UN’s most important member, has 
made democracy promotion a central tenet of its activist foreign policy. From 
Ronald Reagan’s confrontation with the communist world to George H.W. 
Bush’s “New World Order,” Bill Clinton’s policy of democratic enlargement, 
and George W. Bush’s promotion of democracy in the Middle East and else-
where, the US government has given high priority to democratic governance. 
Furthermore, the focus of this American eff ort has been precisely in those 
regions of the world faced with failed states, internal confl icts, and tradi-
tional authoritarian rule – paralleling the geography of UN peacekeeping. 
Given the symmetry of UN peacekeeping goals and American foreign 
policy, it would seem reasonable that broad US support for the United 
Nations would be forthcoming. Yet, the last twenty years have witnessed 
deep tensions in the US–UN relationship that have weakened both actors’ 
ability to promote democratization. This anomalous circumstance has pro-
duced diminished American involvement in UN nation-building missions, 
calls for dramatic reform in the United Nations itself, and a unilateral ten-
dency in American democratization initiatives, most recently in Iraq. Fur-
thermore, in the promotion of democratic nation-building the United 
Nations increasingly has acted not as an intergovernmental organization that 
is a composite of its member states but rather as a separate actor, oft en chal-
lenging US democratization eff orts. This contentious circumstance raises 
important questions about the potential for international democracy pro-
motion by either international organizations or major democratic states, 
about the perceived value of the United Nations to American foreign policy 
in the 21st century, and about the evolving character of the post-Cold War 
United Nations.
The UN’s Promotion of Democracy
Beginning in the late 1980s, the United Nations sought to introduce demo-
cratic practices – most particularly regular elections, human rights protec-
tion, good governance practices, and popular participation – in post-confl ict 
areas. First during the secretary-generalship of Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, and 
then under his two successors Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi  Annan, UN 
peacekeeping moved beyond merely separating combatants to rebuilding 
domestic governments and internal civil societies. In June 1992, Boutros-
Ghali spelled out this ambitious program of UN-sponsored democratic 
nation-building in his report An Agenda for Peace. Boutros-Ghali urged the 
United Nations to identify “at risk” states and to act early in order to avoid 
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the collapse of state sovereignty and internal order, particularly in Asia and 
Africa.1 Paramount for Boutros-Ghali was the democratization of states that 
had long suff ered under authoritarian governments. 
The fi rst UN democratization initiatives in post-confl ict settings were in 
Namibia (1989) and Cambodia (1992). In Namibia the United Nations 
took full administrative control of the former South African mandate region, 
ultimately presiding over elections and the transfer of power to an indepen-
dent government. With the strong support of the United States and the 
other permanent members of the UN Security Council, the Council estab-
lished the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) to 
guide the independence process. UNTAG educated and registered voters, 
and oversaw the 1989 elections for a constituent assembly. UNTAG declared 
the elections – in which 96% of eligible Namibians voted and the South 
West African Peoples’ Organization (SWAPO) won a majority – to be free 
and fair. On March 21, 1990, Namibia achieved full independence and 
UNTAG left  the country. The UN operation’s success served as a model for 
succeeding missions in Central America – El Salvador and Guatemala2 – and 
Asia, particularly in Cambodia.
Cambodia had been in political and military turmoil since the end of the 
Vietnam War. However, Cold War considerations gave the United Nations 
little room to maneuver in proposing or enforcing an internal settlement. 
Only with the end of US–Soviet confrontation and increased international 
cooperation in the early 1990s could the UN play a critical role in facilitating 
Cambodian democratic stability. By August 1990, the permanent members 
of the Security Council reached agreement on a framework for a political 
settlement. Aft er a series of meetings to negotiate the details, the Security 
Council authorized the dispatch of the United Nations Transitional Author-
ity in Cambodia (UNTAC). UNTAC took on an unprecedented set of 
responsibilities to institutionalize the reconciliation of the parties. It man-
aged daily administration of Cambodian foreign and defense policy, pro-
vided domestic government services, and stationed more than 20,000 UN 
personnel in the country. UNTAC administered the fi rst round of Cambo-
dian elections in May 1993. The United States provided extensive electoral 
assistance through the semi-public National Democratic and International 
Republican Institutes. These organizations trained Cambodian parties on 
1) Boutros-Ghali 1992.
2) For coverage of these two countries, see Moore and Pubantz 2002, pp. 104, 131.
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campaign management and party organizational issues.3 UNTAC in turn 
draft ed the election law and trained 50,000 election offi  cials. 
A power-sharing government came to offi  ce that lasted until prime minis-
ter Hun Sen carried out a coup in 1997. The refocusing of the world com-
munity on other crises and America’s growing distaste for nation-building 
operations by 1997 allowed early democratization eff orts to falter. The 
United Nations under Kofi  Annan’s leadership initiated intricate internal 
negotiations and in July 1998, again with international monitors present, 
another controversial election was held, won by Hun Sen. The United 
Nations also provided technical assistance for municipal and parliamentary 
elections in 2002–2003. But continuing human rights violations early in the 
century, and Cambodia’s unwillingness to address the human rights horrors 
of the Pol Pot regime postponed democracy’s achievement. By 2006 the 
United Nations and the Cambodian government had only reached agree-
ment in principle to establish a war crimes tribunal to hold responsible those 
accountable for the 1.5 million Cambodians who were executed or who died 
from starvation and disease during the rule of the Khmer Rouge.
The Namibian experience, coupled with early progress on Cambodia and 
the successful 1991 American-led UN liberation of Kuwait, produced a 
euphoric belief in the promise of the UN’s capability to insure international 
peace and security and to rebuild states along democratic lines. In each of 
these cases the United States lent its full support for UN action. In Cambo-
dia particularly Washington was willing to delegate responsibility to the 
United Nations4 and to provide suffi  cient fi nancial support. There was a 
growing “institutionalization” of the United Nations in American foreign 
policy during George H.W. Bush’s presidency. In the Gulf  War, the president 
had demonstrated the viability of the United Nations. In its aft ermath, UN 
procedures and structures increasingly seemed to be appropriate venues for 
decision-making, even if that meant some limitation on unilateral action, or 
if it meant that outside actors such as the secretary-general would set the 
agenda for international attention and action.
Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace was not dramatically diff erent from an 
emerging “Bush Doctrine” in US foreign policy. Enshrined as “the new world 
order,” the doctrine envisioned a liberal and internationalist America willing 
to lead a multilateral coalition of great powers through UN auspices to end 
3) Dobbins et al. 2004, p. 85.
4) Inoguchi 2000, p. 284.
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aggression in the third world, solve disputes by peaceful negotia tion, and 
intervene to ameliorate humanitarian disasters. In 1988, the year George 
Bush won the presidency, there were fewer than 10,000 UN peacekeepers on 
duty in world hot spots, costing the United Nations $364 million annually.5 
By June 1992 the number of peacekeepers had risen to 44,000, and it would 
approach 80,000 shortly aft er president Clinton’s inauguration. The total 
cost would also rise dramatically to $4 billion a year. The new world order 
was being policed by UN-authorized peacekeeping forces largely initiated by 
US eff orts in the service of humanitarian and democratic nation-building 
purposes around the world. 
With the growing acceptance of a single template for good governance – 
the western Lockean model of representative government – the UN  General 
Assembly in April 1992 created the Electoral Assistance Division in the UN 
secretariat.6 In addition to democratic initiatives in peacekeeping operations, 
the division reviewed country requests for electoral assistance, developed 
operational strategies in cooperation with other UN agencies to hold national 
and municipal elections, provided substantive advice and guidance on elec-
toral matters to member states, and worked with civil society actors to create 
a vibrant democratic process. It also worked closely with regional interna-
tional organizations and non-governmental organizations, including Ameri-
can entities such as the Carter Center to promote democratic election 
procedures. UN democracy initiatives included the protection of opposition 
factions, the political mobilization of marginalized groups, and the restora-
tion or creation of judicial institutions in order to assure the rule of law and 
the defense of individual liberties. By June 2004, 101 nations had requested 
UN electoral assistance, and the United Nations had provided support in 
91 cases, including troubled places such as Mozambique, Palestine, Bosnia, 
and Angola.
In addition to the Electoral Assistance Division, a companion offi  ce was 
created in the UN Development Programme (UNDP): the Management, 
Development and Governance Division. By 2000 one third of the UNDP 
budget went toward democracy promotion.7 In 2001 alone the UN Devel-
opment Programme spent $800 million in 145 countries on democratic gov-
ernance projects. Among these were funds for national elections in Sierra 
5) Staff  Report, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 1993, p. viii.
6) A/RES/46/137, 17 December 1991.
7) Burnell 2000, pp. 51–52.
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Leone, enhanced public participation in Nigeria, and a judicial commission 
in Afghanistan to restore its justice system.8 Additionally, UN resolutions, 
statements of secretaries-general, and world conferences all reinforced demo-
cratic nation-building as a primary task of the United Nations. The General 
Assembly passed a series of “election resolutions”9 and “democracy resolu-
tions”10 between 1988 and 1998. 
With these resolutions, however, a broadening understanding of democ-
racy emerged in UN deliberations. GA Resolution 31 in November of 1998 
defi ned the UN democratization eff ort in troubled states in comprehensive 
terms, calling for “building a political culture through human rights obser-
vance, mobilization of civil society, electoral assistance, free and independent 
media, enhancing the rule of law, and improving accountability, transpar-
ency, and the quality of public sector management and democratic structures 
of government.”11 In the summer of 1993 the United Nations convened the 
World Conference on Human Rights, also known as the Vienna Conference, 
which highlighted the links among development, democracy and the pro-
motion of human rights.
The 1996 election of Kofi  Annan as the UN’s seventh secretary-general 
brought to the offi  ce an advocate of the Kantian thesis that democracies do 
not wage war with each other. He also held a more comprehensive view of 
democratic society than contemplated by the representational model of 
European and American discourse. He promoted the concept of “personal 
sovereignty,” which the secretary-general argued required intercession in 
non-democratic states that did not protect the rights of their citizens. 
Defending the new era of nation-building, he made the case that “surely no 
legal principle – not even [state] sovereignty – can ever shield crimes against 
humanity.” There is a “moral duty” for the United Nations to intervene on 
behalf of the individual.12 At the time of the Millennium Summit in 2000 
Kofi  Annan acknowledged that the United Nations is a forum for coordinat-
ing the interests and behavior of states, but he asserted it is something more 
 8) Brown 2003, pp. 143–144.
 9) A/RES/43/157, 8 December 1988; A/RES/44/146, 15 December 1989; A/RES/52/129, 
12 December 1997.
10) A/RES/50/133, 20 December 1995; A/RES/51/31, 6 December 1996; A/RES/52/18, 
21 November 1997.
11) A/R0ES/53/31, 23 November 1998.
12) Annan 2000, p. 48.
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than this. “Even though the United Nations is an organization of states,” he 
said, “the Charter is written in the name of ‘We the peoples.’ It reaffi  rms the 
dignity and worth of the human person, respect for human rights and the 
equal rights of men and women, and a commitment to social progress . . . in 
freedom from want and fear alike.”13 
The Millennium Summit proved a watershed in the UN’s redefi nition of 
democracy promotion. The Summit’s declaration endorsed a combination 
of development, human rights, and democratization targets. Member gov-
ernments proclaimed “We shall spare no eff ort to promote democracy and 
strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect . . . all internationally recognized 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, . . . to strengthen the capacity of all 
our countries to implement the principles and practices of democracy and 
respect for human rights, including minority rights . . . [and] to work collec-
tively for more inclusive political processes, allowing genuine participation 
by all citizens in all our  countries.” 
The late Sergio Vieiro de Mello, former UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, described the UN eff ort to create “holistic democracy” to 
the Commission on Human Rights in April 2003, eight months before his 
death in the bombing of the UN’s Baghdad headquarters. He defi ned democ-
racy as “normatively grounded,”14 and inclusive of both procedural and sub-
stantive rights. Democracy in UN parlance is encapsulated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and the International Covenants on 
Political and Civil Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(1966), and thus encompases “formal institutions and informal processes, 
majorities and minorities, males and females, governments and civil society, 
the political and economic, the national and international . . . the interdepen-
dence of human rights and the rights they defend . . . the principle and right 
of self-determination . . . as well as the rights to an adequate standard of living 
and to education.”15 Thus, the UN conception of democracy goes well 
beyond the usual western defi nition to include social and economic obliga-
tions on the part of the state to its citizens.
13) Annan 2000, p. 7.
14) Report of the high Commissioner for Human Rights, E/CN/.4/2003/59, 27 January 
2003, paragraph 3.
15) Report of the high Commissioner for Human Rights, E/CN/.4/2003/59, 27 January 
2003, paragraph 3.
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Evolving US Support for Democratic Nation-Building
The United Nations undertook a precedent-setting initiative to implant 
democracy in Somalia. In December 1992, the Security Council, using its 
enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorized 
intervention led by the United States. Without the invitation of the domes-
tic government, the Council sent forces not only to provide humanitarian 
assistance and security, but also to restore political stability, the rule of law, a 
functioning democracy, and reconciliation among ethnic groups. As a result, 
in February 2000, the UN facilitated a peace conference in Djibouti that led 
to the election of a new Somali president and national assembly, and the cre-
ation of a Transitional National Government. The Somali model of inter-
vention under Chapter VII was replicated with varying degrees of success 
over the next twelve years in  Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanis-
tan, and Liberia. 
Despite warnings from his advisers that the United States could be caught 
up in a civil war with little meaning for national interests, president George 
H.W. Bush responded to a plea from UN secretary-general Boutros-Ghali to 
assist the existing peacekeeping mission in the country (UNOSOM I) by 
moving stores of food from Mogadishu to the starving millions in the coun-
tryside.16 By fall 1992, a half million Somalis had died from war, disease and 
starvation, including nearly one quarter of Somali children in the southern 
region of the country.17 The American-led operation was expected to be 
short-term and quickly turned over to UN administration (UNOSOM II). 
President Bush expressed his hope that US forces would already be with-
drawing from Somalia as president-elect Clinton was inaugurated.
Th at was not to happen. A self-styled “pragmatic Wilsonian,” Clinton 
picked up in January 1993 where his predecessor had left  off . He encouraged 
an expansive role for the United Nations, arguing to the American people 
that multilateralism through the UN held the best opportunity for burden-
sharing and global security. In his fi rst address to the General Assembly he 
said, “I hope the United States will always be willing to do its part” in sup-
port of UN peacekeeping operations. However, events in Somalia, coupled 
with the continuing crisis in the Balkans and a new conservative Republican 
16) For a full discussion of president Bush’s “moralist” motivations for sending troops to 
Somalia, see Burgess 1997.
17) For a complete history and analysis of the UN eff ort in Somalia and the American inter-
vention, see Hirsch and Oakley 1995.
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 majority winning control of both houses of Congress in 1994 tested, and 
ultimately undermined that commitment. In the wake of these events the 
administration was not only more cautious about democratic nation-building, 
but more demanding of fundamental reform of the United Nations.
Pressured by the UN secretary-general to expand the Somali mission from 
the relatively limited mandate of providing a secure environment for human-
itarian relief to a full-fl edged eff ort at political reconciliation and the cre-
ation of democratic government, president Clinton made no immediate 
eff ort to extricate US forces. His commitment refl ected the new “assertive 
multilateralism”18 espoused by UN ambassador Madeleine Albright. While 
recognizing that the United States could not “respond to every alarm,”19 and 
that “there was no magic formula,”20 Clinton and his advisers looked to inter-
national cooperation through UN mechanisms, particularly to the UN 
Security Council’s permanent members, as the initial step in resolving post-
Cold War confl ict.
The UN multilateral force of 28,000 troops had a contingent of 4,000 US 
personnel under UN command, including a 1,300 man American Quick 
Reaction Force. The Security Council directed UNOSOM II to disarm the 
warlords and begin the nation-building process.21 Albright lauded the UN 
action, hailing it as “an unprecedented enterprise and nothing less than the 
restoration of an entire country.”22 Her boss, secretary of state Christopher, 
noted that “for the fi rst time there will be a sturdy American role to help the 
United Nations rebuild a viable nation-state.”23
The “enemy” for the United Nations in Somalia quickly became General 
Mohamed Farah Aideed, one of the primary competitors for power, and 
“warlord” of the most powerful faction in Mogadishu. Aideed’s forces 
ambushed and killed two dozen Pakistani peacekeepers on June 5, 1993. 
18) Albright fi rst used the term in testimony before the US House of Representatives Subcom-
mittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights in June, 
1993. While continuing to endorse its underlying sentiment, Albright later referred to the 
term as “without appeal,” and as “the sound bite that bit me.” Albright 2003, p. 176.
19) Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 13 January 1993, as reprinted 
in Christopher 1998, p. 27.
20) Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 13 January 1993, as reprinted 
in Christopher 1998, p. 27.
21) S/Res/814, 26 March 1993.
22) See Hyland 1999, p. 56.
23) Gordon 1993, A7.
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Washington immediately sought a UN resolution ordering the arrest of the 
warlord. Both the United Nations and the United States shift ed their mis-
sions, in a classic case of “mission creep,” to root out the enemies of UN 
nation-building in  Somalia.24 
Events came to a head on October 3, when eighteen US soldiers were 
trapped in a fi refi ght and killed. Americans were presented on the evening 
news with pictures of their dead soldiers, one of whom was pulled through 
the streets of Mogadishu, apparently by gleeful supporters of Aideed. The 
revulsion with American involvement in Somalia (later captured in the pop-
ular fi lm Black Hawk Down) was complete. While he would enlarge the US 
contingent for the time being, he dropped the search for Aideed and with-
drew all US forces within six months. As far as the president was concerned, 
there would be no more Somalias.25 Aft er Somalia, the administration did 
not use the term “assertive multilateralism” again. Events in Somalia more 
than anywhere else moved US foreign policy from the cooperative US–UN 
nation-building course and toward a new concern for the dangers the over-
extension of UN activity could present for American national interests.
The fi rst victim of the post-Somalia caution in Washington was the small 
central African state of Rwanda. In April 1994 Rwandan Hutus launched a 
well planned massacre of the Tutsi minority. By the time the killing ended in 
early summer, more than 800,000 had been slaughtered and more than a 
 million were in refugee camps outside Rwanda. When the massacres broke 
out, the United States proposed that the Security Council cut back, not 
enlarge, the number of peacekeepers in the region out of fear for the peace-
keepers’ safety. Under pressure from Washington, the Security Council cut 
the force  to 70 observers.26 The Clinton administration even worried about 
the provision of logistical support that might drag Americans into unin-
tended involvement. In the end Washington provided meager resources – 
$500  million in relief through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
24) Operating essentially independent of UN control, US forces for practical purposes 
declared war on Aideed with a surprise helicopter gunship attack on a suspected meeting of 
Aideed’s lieutenants on July 12. Then, following the deaths of four US peacekeepers in August, 
Clinton augmented the force and redoubled eff orts to capture the warlord. See Delaney 2004, 
p. 36.
25) For a description of the shift  in sentiment within the White House and State Department, 
see Shattuck 2003, pp. 22–40.
26) S/Res/912, 21 April 1994.
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(UNHCR)27 – and backed a Security Council endorsement of unilateral 
French action in Rwanda. 
The latter decision would prove to be an important precedent for future 
Russian actions in Georgia, the United States in Haiti, the US and NATO in 
Kosovo, and Australia in East Timor. The procedure of “subcontracting” – 
authorizing a state or group of states to act on behalf of the world community 
in the restoration of peace and stability – became a regular feature of  Security 
Council action following Rwanda. The United States would sub sequently 
evolve the practice into a mechanism by which it would move toward unilat-
eral intervention followed by a request to the Security Council for the equiv-
alent of a post-dated authorization. President Clinton employed the strata-
gem in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and President George W. Bush used it in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The practical logic of subcontracting, however, leads 
to independent action by a member state that may or may not be in harmony 
with UN goals and practices. For the United States it allowed the emergence 
of a separate nation-building and democratization eff ort in Iraq following 
the 2003 war.
The crisis of Rwanda proved to be the nadir of Clinton’s UN peacekeep-
ing policy; what then assistant secretary of state John Shattuck later called 
“a catastrophic disengagement.”28 It refl ected the near paranoia about US 
involvement in confl ict situations such as had occurred in Somalia. It 
cemented Washington’s antipathy toward Boutros-Ghali and his ambitious 
program of democratic nation-building. It also contributed to the delibera-
tions that started to fashion a more consistent administration approach 
toward the United Nations, its utility as an instrument for addressing the 
civil confl icts of the new millennium, and the merits of tying US democrati-
zation interests to UN peacekeeping. With the Rwandan episode the United 
States started down the road of developing an independent peacekeeping 
strategy that then morphed over two presidencies into unilateral attempts at 
democratic nation-building following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001.
Just days aft er the opening horrifi c events in Rwanda, the administration 
issued Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), signifi cantly curtailing 
the American commitment to UN nation-building operations. The presi-
dent’s statement confi rmed that it was no longer US policy “to expand the 
27) Kuperman 2001, pp. 56–58.
28) Shattuck 2003, p. 16.
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number of UN peace operations, or US involvement in [them].”29 The policy 
established sixteen criteria that had to be met before the United States would 
vote for a new peacekeeping operation or directly participate in one. Rwanda 
was the fi rst case where the president’s new policy had been applied.
Signifi cantly, PDD-25 also demanded fi nancial reform of the United 
Nations itself. The United States proposed a cut in the US assessment for 
peacekeeping to 25 percent of the UN budget, and the reform of the UN’s 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations. PDD-25 had not started out this 
way. Early deliberations were premised on an active commitment to Boutros-
Ghali’s Agenda for Peace. Nearly a year before PDD-25’s promulgation, 
 Clinton had signed off  on Presidential Review Directive 13 (PRD-13), a 
review that leaned toward support for UN command of nation-building 
operations and an expanded US role in them. In line with the philosophy of 
the emerging document, the administration placed US troops under UN 
command for the fi rst time in Macedonia and Somalia.30 
Also driving the shift  in administration policy was the growing conserva-
tive Republican hostility on Capitol Hill toward the UN and toward the 
White House’s support of UN nation-building missions, and the divergent 
aims of democratization as understood by the United Nations and the United 
States. With the 1994 congressional elections looming, Republicans saw in 
the Somalia fi asco an opportunity to attack administration policy. The 
minority leader in the House Representatives, Dick Armey of Texas, argued 
that the nation “had gone too far in the direction of globalism.”31 Republi-
cans introduced the National Security Revitalization Act, which required 
the administration to seek congressional approval for the commitment of 
forces to UN peacekeeping. In the Senate minority leader Robert Dole intro-
duced the Peace Powers Act that restated the language of the 1945 UN Par-
ticipation Act requiring congressional approval for providing US military 
units to the Security Council. Both Houses, moreover, appropriated far less 
than the president requested for peacekeeping operations.32 The House and 
Senate were ready for a fi ght with the administration over any continuing US 
support for UN nation-building.
29) White House 1994. 
30) For a critical review of PRD-13, see Rodman 1994, p. 32. On the matter of US troops in 
Macedonia and Somalia, see Smith and Preston 1993.
31) Hendrickson 1998, p. 243.
32) Browne 2003.
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Defi nitional Dissonance
By the time of Bill Clinton’s second inauguration the United States govern-
ment was well on its way to developing its own democratic nation-building 
apparatus and modus operandi in the service of its classical liberal conception 
of democracy. The last decade has witnessed an American eff ort at democ-
racy construction unequaled since the end of World War II, little of it under 
the auspices of the United Nations, most of it either through multilateral 
devices outside the UN system or through unilateral action. Faced with 
strong criticism from conservatives in Congress, president Clinton decided 
to proceed in Bosnia and Haiti for all practical purposes unilaterally, to cut 
the number of servicemen under UN command drastically,33 and to demand 
a change in leadership at the United Nations when the secretary-general’s 
term ended in 1997.
In the case of Haiti, while the president sought and got a UN Security 
Council authorization,34 the White House determined the policy and tactics 
to remove the military junta that had overthrown democratically elected 
president Jean Bertrand Aristide. Using what secretary of state Warren Chris-
topher characterized as “a coalition of the willing,”35 a term heard regularly in 
the subsequent Bush administration, the United States returned Aristide to 
power in October 1994. The Haitian mission “opened the way for the devel-
opment of a new doctrine of [US] ‘humanitarian intervention’”36 that would 
be used again in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
In the wake of Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, Clinton shift ed his attention 
from UN-based solutions to the military option available in a refocused 
NATO. In August 1994 Clinton threatened to lift  unilaterally the arms 
embargo with the Muslim government in Sarajevo if the latest UN peace 
plan was not accepted by Bosnian Serbs. Following the revolting massacre 
of Muslim men and boys in the town of Srebrenica in July 1995, NATO 
launched substantial and decisive air attacks against Serb emplacements. The 
United Nations was left  out of the decision-making. 
33) This trend would continue under the subsequent administration of George W. Bush. By 
October 2004 there were only 28 US military personnel serving under UN command in a 
total of fi ve UN operations. Serafi no 2004.
34) S/Res/940, 31 July 1994.
35) Christopher 1998, p. 182.
36) Shattuck 2003, p. 287. This is also the assessment to be found in Gordon 1994, p. 134.
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Invited by Clinton to Dayton, Ohio, the leaders of Serbia, Croatia, and 
Bosnia hammered out the Dayton Accords,37 an American imposed settle-
ment that assured security in Bosnia. In the Accords, all parties agreed to 
establish a permanent ceasefi re in Bosnia, repatriate refugees, and create a 
multiethnic democratic state with a tripartite presidency and autonomous 
ethnic enclaves. The attempt to reestablish peace, stability, and democracy in 
the Balkans became an American responsibility. The president also came 
under increasing pressure to capture indicted war criminals and deliver them 
to the UN war crimes tribunal in The Hague. The United Nations was given 
a minor role in post-confl ict Bosnia. In Kosovo, the UN role would be larger 
following the 1999 NATO intervention. UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo) 
would oversee day-to-day civil government in the province, but the decision 
to intervene, security strategy, and the outline of how to proceed with 
democratization were all decided in Washington. 
Democratization is a complex process with which the United States had 
had little practice by the turn of the century. As a recent RAND study38 
found, American eff orts to convert authoritarian or failed states to stable 
democracy requires extensive manpower, signifi cant funds,39 and a bureau-
cratic  architecture for its success. Having not undertaken democracy promo-
tion since the immediate post World War II days, the United States had to 
start from scratch in the 1990s once it abandoned the UN structures. The 
lead agencies in Washington for this purpose quickly became the Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the United States Information 
Agency (USIA), and the United States Information Service (USIS).40 
USAID focused on traditional liberal procedural democratic practices: 
encouraging the rule of law, promoting competitive elections and political 
processes, developing civil society, and promoting good governance.  Spending 
only $722 million in 2003,41 its resources amounted to a mere 9 per cent of 
total US development assistance, which in turn, when compared to other 
donor nations, is the lowest share of GNP (0.11% in 2001) of any developed 
37) For the complete history of the Dayton Accords, see Holbrooke 1998.
38) Dobbins 2004.
39) This judgment is confi rmed in Joyner 2002, pp. 169–170.
40) For a full discussion of the role of these agencies in democracy promotion see Hearn and 
Robin son 2000, pp. 241–262.
41) Finkel et al. 2006, p. 26.
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nation. Democracy aid has also been dispersed over 121 nations since 1990,42 
diluting its impact in specifi c and important cases.
External to the federal government, US democracy promotion funds have 
been funneled through non-governmental organizations, particularly the 
National Democratic Institute for International Aff airs (NDI) and the Inter-
national Republican Institute (IRI). The National Endowment for Democ-
racy (NED) disperses funds approved by Congress to these organizations as 
well as to the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) and the 
American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS). Largely 
headed by former offi  cials in the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations, 
these NGOs support technical programs in more than 100 countries to pro-
mote party development and electoral systems, complementing and some-
times duplicating UN eff orts through its Election Assistance Division. 
Particularly the IRI has been closely associated with conservative Republican 
eff orts to promote American-based democracy programs unconnected to 
UN projects.
The American defi nition of democratization at the new millennium still 
held to narrower criteria than the holistic view put forward by the United 
Nations. A 2006 study for USAID measured democratization in terms of 
progress on voting rights, participation, electoral competitiveness, civil liber-
ties,  procedural vitality of civil society, decentralized governance, govern-
ment eff ectiveness, corruption, and human rights.43 The study, conducted by 
a team at Vanderbilt University, concluded that US aid on all of these indica-
tors, with the exception of human rights, had a modest positive correlation. 
In the case of human rights, US assistance had a negative impact.44 Not 
included in US interpretations of democracy promotion was the need to 
promote group rights, gender equality, or any of the social and economic 
targets of the Millennium Development Goals.
At the new millennium the US government was promoting both inside 
the UN system and beyond its structures a new democracy movement, 
including an eff ort to create intergovernmental fora for democratic states 
only. The most important initiative was the Community of Democracies 
(CoD), which many critics of the United Nations conceptualized as an 
alternative international organization for promoting US global democratic 
goals. Strongly encouraged by the US government, in June 2000 more than 
42) Finkel et al. 2006, p. 14.
43) Finkel et al. 2006, pp. 95–96.
44) Finkel et al. 2006, p. 2.
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100 nations issued the Warsaw Declaration founding the intergovernmental 
group. As contemplated by the US State Department the CoD could improve 
UN resolutions and activities in democracy promotion and serve as a “sup-
plementary network”45 for democratization. The Community dedicated 
itself to “the continuous development of democracy domestically and the 
promotion of democracy regionally and globally,”46 but studiously avoided 
defi ning the United Nations as a key organ in the democratic movement. In 
a “Dialogue on Democracy” on 5-6 June 2003 participating states urged the 
CoD to “use sub-regional organizations (SADC, ECOWAS, CARICOM, 
MERCOSUR, and others) to promote democratic development, prevent 
backsliding, and address challenges to democracy,”47 and to employ them “as 
a vehicle to address transnational problems that also threaten democracy, i.e. 
public health concerns, narco-traffi  cking, terrorism, etc.”48 No mention of 
the United Nations appeared in the fi nal communiqué.
On 1 November 2004, the CoD convened in New York and established 
the Democratic Caucus of the United Nations. Avowedly created to pro-
mote reform in the United Nations, the caucus emphasized the promotion 
of democratic principles in UN work. The caucus became an important tool 
of US policy in its eff ort to replace the UN Commission on Human Rights 
with a reformed Council with a membership of only pro-democracy states 
with strong human rights records. The election in 2000 of a conservative 
Republican administration that was cool if not hostile toward the United 
Nations and its nation-building missions only accelerated the separation 
between the democratization programs of the United Nations and the 
United States. 
The US–UN Relationship
American foreign policy toward UN nation-building has an evolutionary 
quality to it, moving from the long-felt desire to see an active and eff ective 
United Nations right the problems of world aff airs to a nearly unilateral 
45) US Department of State Bureau of Public Aff airs Release, September 27, 2004.
46) Joint Press Communiqué, Community of Democracies Convening Group’ Ministerial 
Meeting, New York, September 26, 2003, at the 58th UN General Assembly.
47) US State Department Release. “Dialogue on Democracy: Summation of Best Practices and 
Key Ideas, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/democ/21692.htm.
48) US State Department Release. “Dialogue on Democracy: Summation of Best Practices and 
Key Ideas, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/democ/21692.htm.
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American response. The two year period from the deaths of the marines in 
the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia, in October 1993 to the resolution in 
October 1995 of the confl ict that had rained mortars on Sarajevo, Bosnia, 
witnessed the development of a new strategy for addressing the humanitar-
ian crises of the time, and of a new critical approach to the UN. Concomi-
tant with the change in American policy came an American demand for UN 
reform and a change in the world body’s leadership by the Clinton adminis-
tration. President George W. Bush pushed the divide between the United 
Nations and the United States even wider. 
In the aft ermath of the 9/11 attacks, the president’s war on terrorism was 
an overwhelming unilateral initiative. There was strong multilateral support 
for Washington’s decision to remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, 
curtail Al Qaeda activities there, and seek the democratic reconstruction of 
the country. But Afghanistan slipped from the front pages of the world’s 
newspapers as the Bush administration announced that nations were “either 
with us or against us,” that there were some unwelcome nations who made up 
an “axis of evil,” and that one of them – Iraq – needed to be struck immedi-
ately, preemptively, even unilaterally if the other members of the Security 
Council refused to accede to US demands for military action. 
Despite the challenge of Afghanistan, attention in Washington shift ed to 
Iraq. During much of 2002 and into early 2003, disagreements within the 
Security Council on the reasonableness of war with Iraq became public. 
Washington warned of the certain “irrelevancy” of the UN should the Secu-
rity Council fail to accede to war. In June 2002, Bush asserted a new foreign 
policy of preemption, coupling fundamental US security concerns with the 
need for “regime change” in Baghdad. In succeeding months the president 
further defi ned US goals in Iraq and in the wider Middle East in terms of 
bringing about democratic regimes.
In March 2003, the United States with a “coalition of the willing” invaded 
Iraq, but without an authorizing UN resolution. While the US seemed to 
“win” the 2003 war in Iraq, postwar challenges proved more intractable than 
originally thought. Francis Fukuyama has concluded that “this was due in 
part to the unilateral way in which the administration went into war, which 
left  it mostly bereft  of international partners for its eff ort, and in part to 
internal bureaucratic struggles that left  organization of the reconstruction 
eff ort in the hands of the Pentagon.”49 The Defense Department’s fi rst 
49) Fukuyama 2004.
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administrator in Iraq, retired  general Jay Garner, rejected his own adviser’s 
admonition that it would “take a little longer to do democratization than 
three of four months in the summer in  Baghdad.”50 Garner hoped to convene 
quickly a national conference and forge a unity government, largely drawing 
on emigré Iraqi politicians to fi ll key posts. 
When Garner’s unrealistic eff orts proved disappointing, he was replaced 
by L. Paul Bremer. Bremer was no fan of a UN role in Iraqi democracy-
 building. Even aft er the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1483 legiti-
mizing the occupation, Bremer gave only the slightest regard to the resolution’s 
requirement that the Coalition Provisional Authority work “intensively” 
with the secretary-general’s special representative, Sergio Vieira de Mello.51 
By spring 2004, more than 800 Americans had been killed in the country, 
and over 80 per cent of those deaths had occurred aft er president Bush 
announced the end of combat on May 1, 2003 (compared to about 120 
American deaths in Afghanistan over a longer period of involvement). The 
usefulness of unilateral “preemption” and American-dominated democrati-
zation eff orts outside the sanction of the United Nations were at the least 
open to debate. In March, American Iraqi policy shift ed abruptly,52 as offi  -
cials announced the US intention to transfer sovereignty to an interim Iraqi 
government – a government selected by secretary-general Annan’s special 
representative Lahkdar Brahimi. Ambassador Brahimi conducted delicate 
negotiations among the various Iraqi political groupings, the CPA, the lead-
ers of the interim transitional government and produced an agreement on an 
interim government made up of a president, two vice presidents, a prime 
minister, and a council of ministers. The United Nations then set up the 
process that led to January 2005 elections and a subsequent constitutional 
referendum. None of this, however, brought consolidated democracy to Iraq. 
Sectarian divisions, insurgency, a narrow defi nition of democracy by the gov-
ernment in Washington, and continuing American occupation hindered 
achievement of a democratic Iraq.
50) Reported in Diamond 2005, p. 32.
51) The UN mission was left  poorly defended and to its own agenda. When de Mello and 
21 of his colleagues were killed in the August 2003 bombing of the UN’s Baghdad headquar-
ters, the secretary-general withdrew the UN presence from Iraq completely. Among other 
demands, Annan insisted that sovereignty be transferred to the Iraqis before the United 
Nations injected itself again into the democratization eff ort.
52) Phillips 2005, p. 205.
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The Merits of Convergence
The “negotiation” that went on between the United States and the United 
Nations concerning the role the latter would play in Iraqi democratization 
was emblematic of the new relationship between an international organ-
ization, with an inclusive perception of democracy and its own democracy 
promotion program, and its most important member. International organi-
zations, made up of sovereign states, are oft en described as creatures of their 
memberships, unable to act independently of the will of their members. By 
the 21st century the United Nations, or at least its secretariat, had emerged 
as an independent actor. This independence was challenged by an adminis-
tration in Washington that believed deeply in its own variant of global 
democratization, unilateral American power, and the dysfunctionality of the 
United Nations. In 2003 the mix of competing interests produced a standoff  
that put the United Nations at what Kofi  Annan called “a fork in the road,” 
with the world body limited in what it might do to address the dangers of the 
time, and the United States seeking tighter budgetary and administrative 
control over UN nation-building.
While not perfect by any criteria, the UN track record on democratic 
nation-building has been reasonably good, certainly better than unilateral 
American eff orts in Iraq. Beginning with Namibia in the 1980s, the United 
Nations has sought to impose a transitional administration on fragmented 
states, overseeing the entire political process. Simon Chesterman has charac-
terized this procedure as “benevolent autocracy.”53 It is a contradictory pro-
cess to be sure, for it “imposes” democracy. Yet, most studies demonstrate 
qualifi ed success. Table 1 uses the criteria established by Freedom House to 
measure levels of democratization. Comparative evaluations are taken from 
the Polity IV Project at the University of Maryland. When signifi cant 
resources and lengthy international commitment are given to UN nation-
building missions, such as in Namibia, East Timor, and El Salvador, there 
seems to be signifi cant progress on consolidating democratic societies. The 
outcome of American eff orts seems more problematic.
In the case of Iraq the American inability to rally international support, 
and its unwillingness to provide suffi  cient funds, to put experienced nation-
builders in the fi eld, to see democratization as a process inclusive of social 
and economic goods, and to employ a strategy that does not create a backlash 
to perceived imperialist ambitions have undermined good US intentions. 
53) See Newman  and Rich 2004, p. 12.
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The divergent American path has forced demands for reform of the UN, but 
the reality may be that the lack of US support for UN eff orts54 may be the 
heart of limited eff ectiveness on both sides.
Beginning with the intervention in Somalia the UN Security Council 
“subcontracted” a second-generation peacekeeping operation to the United 
States. This strategy calls upon a member state or regional group of states to 
lead a UN intervention force. In addition to Somalia, subcontracting has 
been employed in East Timor, Georgia, Rwanda, Afghanistan, and Sudan. 
But subcontracting nation-building missions in essence grants broad latitude 
to the intervening nations to conduct operations as they see fi t. It is a short 
step from acting on behalf of the world community and with its grant of 
legitimacy to acting unilaterally and without practical accountability. In the 
case of the United States, which had been developing its own democratiza-
tion programs during the 1990s, subcontracting evolved in practical terms 
54) On this point, see Joyner 2002, p. 169.
Table 1 Democratization in states with nation-building operations
listed in chronological order by date of UN Security Council  authorization
Country Polity IV Freedom House
(0 low, 10 high)
Congo 0.0 2.9
Namibia 6.0 8.6
El Salvador 3.0 8.6
Cambodia 3.0 2.9
Somalia   – 2.9
Haiti 1.0 2.0
Mozambique 6.0 2.9
Bosnia   – 5.7
Eastern Slavonia 7.0 8.6
Sierra Leone 5.0 5.7
East Timor 6.0 7.1
Kosovo   –  –
Afghanistan   – 2.9
Iraq 0.0 1.4
Source: Dobbins, Jones, Crane, Rathmell, Steele, and Teltschik 2004, p. xxii. 
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into wholly constructed US democracy-building eff orts subject to little 
 international accountability. Without perceived international authorization, 
US democracy promotion cannot be expected to succeed in settings such 
as Iraq.
The divide between Washington and New York over democratization 
holds a serious threat to the future of the United Nations itself. Beyond the 
US demands for UN reform and the important challenge to collective secu-
rity that American unilateral intervention portends, for the fi rst time since 
1945 the UN’s most important member has taken the fi rst steps toward the 
construction of an alternative multilateral structure, one more in perceived 
harmony with the US vision of democratization. The creation of the Com-
munity of Democracies and the Democracy Caucus represent the subtle 
entertainment of the notion that the promotion of global peace through the 
march of democracy might be better served through a new international 
organizational alternative to the 60 year old postwar United Nations. This is 
a challenge not only to the organization but also to the major powers of 
Europe and Asia that see in the United Nations a counterweight to the 
extraordinary global power of the United States.
Whether the UN-US relationship can be repaired before serious damage 
is done to the democratization eff orts of both Washington and the United 
Nations and to the UN as an institution turns in large part on the evolution 
of presidential policy. The division between the United States and the United 
Nations is not simply explained by party, ideology, or domestic politics. The 
divergence began during the Clinton administration and has only widened 
in the Bush years. However, the diffi  culty of promoting democracy in Iraq 
and the subsequent turn to the United Nations for assistance holds hope for 
further evolution, a closing of the gap. Democracy-building legitimized and 
largely administered by the United Nations appears to present the best 
chance for success, especially when it is funded, endorsed, and assisted by the 
world’s most signifi cant powers, most particularly by the United States.
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